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Abstract
The level of corruption in an economy is generally thought to influence
economic growth adversely. We show that the performance of the Soviet
economy was affected not only by the level of corruption but also by its
quality, that is, how corrupt incomes were used. In the context of a partially
centralized economy, changes in a government control mechanism influenced
the quality of corruption and thus economic performance. On the basis of new
historical research on the Soviet command system we analyse the choices of a
plan-setter and an effort-setter who interacted with each other and an external
market to determine real output, hidden inflation, and the level and quality of
corruption simultaneously. Our results explain rapid Soviet economic growth
despite high corruption levels, and why slower economic growth in the 1970s
was accompanied by increased privatization of rents.
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Introduction
The principle of hierarchy relies on the obedient compliance of agents at lower
levels with the orders issued by their superiors. The problem of hierarchy
arises because agents provide much of the information on which their
superiors rely to monitor compliance and are able to exploit this information
asymmetry in their own self-interest to seek a quiet life or skim off internal
resources. This problem is magnified to the extent that the hierarchy in
question does not fully control its external environment; this adds outside
options to the agent’s internal scope for disloyal behaviour.
The Soviet command economy faced this problem in controlling the
Soviet firm. Towards the end of the 1920s the Soviet state embarked on a
mobilisation drive that permanently altered the economy’s microfoundations
(Davies 1994a). Controls on firm behaviour arising from the market
mechanism were replaced by administrative controls. The economy began to
allocate a much higher proportion of the resources available to investment, and
for some decades it also grew faster (Bergson 1961). At the same time the
Soviet firm did not suddenly become the obedient agent of centralized plans.
Instead, the high-level ordering of resource allocation involved a running
battle with the desire of agents at lower levels not to be mobilized but to
pursue their own interests.
Economists have modelled these tendencies in a variety of ways.
Researchers such as Berliner (1957) and Nove (1958) quickly identified the
information and incentive problems associated with administrative
performance indicators. Among these was the search for a “quiet life” which
Hicks (1935) first associated with monopoly; Weitzman (1970) developed this
idea as a dynamic disincentive associated with the “ratchet” effect and Kornai
(1980) generalized it as his famous “soft” budget constraint. The interaction
between the planned and market spheres also attracted attention. To some
observers (Nuti 1989; Shleifer and Vishny 1993) this naturally gave rise to the
idea that the formal and informal sectors existed in a joint equilibrium. Others
(Grossman 1977, 1979) noted that, while corruption might grease the wheels
of the command system in some respects, it could also undermine its
legitimacy, implying that their joint equilibrium could only be temporary:
eventually, one must drive out the other.
In this paper we begin from an historical, if stylized fact: the Soviet
economy worked not unsuccessfully for a number of decades. This is not to
say that it worked for the best, but it did provide full employment and, after a
notably bad start in the thirties and forties, rising living standards. It did not
2harness the forces of self-interest particularly well, but it did harness them to
some extent.
The literature does not provide a convincing explanation of how the
planned economy harnessed the self-interest of the producer. Existing models
focus, as a rule, on the dysfunctions of the state-enterprise relationship and the
incentives to inefficient or corrupt behaviour. Such models are not wrong but
they are incomplete in two senses. First, those that seek to capture the search
for a quiet life and the toleration of inefficiency tend to downplay or exclude
the pecuniary motivations that drove corruption and informal-economy
behaviour; symmetrically, those that focus one-sidedly on the preference for
leisure do not account for preferences for money. Second, both classes of
model are uninformative about the spurs to effort and improvement in the
Soviet system, tending to view them as superimposed entirely from above.
Such theoretical lacunae, moreover, limit our ability to understand the
historical evolution of Soviet economic outcomes: what happened in the
course of the 1970s, for example, that appears to have allowed the incentives
that previously encouraged effort and productivity to slip increasingly out of
alignment?
In this paper we will provide an historically rooted model of the Soviet
firm as an actor that pursued preferences for both leisure and liquidity, could
exploit external opportunities for corruption, and also had to negotiate
constraints imposed by the higher authority of the plan. In our model a plan-
setter and an effort-setter fix the scale and uses of corrupt side payments
simultaneously with effort, output, and prices. Our model is informed by the
historical research that we and others have undertaken in the former Soviet
archives since 1991. A new view of prices and monetary flows in the Soviet
economy is at the core of this model.
Standard models of Soviet pricing present the Soviet firm as a price-taker.
The source of this stereotype is the official myth of the command system in
which the centre administered prices and imposed them on producers. Western
economists had voiced longstanding empirical concerns (summarized by
Harrison 2000) about the stability of official prices, and especially how the
enterprise might exploit product variations to free itself from price controls.
This ought to have suggested that the idea of the Soviet firm as price-taker was
oversimplified. But such concerns tended to be forgotten whenever economists
were tempted to offer theoretical generalizations (Nove 1958; Ames 1965;
Gregory and Stuart 1974; Ericson 1983, 1984; Goldfeld and Quandt 1988,
1990). In contrast to these, we will start from the evidence-based proposition
that the Soviet firm was a price maker: it held the initiative in the price-setting
process through its control of the information that the centre required to
authorize pricing decisions, and exploited this advantage to set prices in a self-
interested way.
The literature that we have already noted approached monetary flows in
much the same spirit as they handled pricing. In theory, money was secondary.
Firms’ soft budget constraints were said to create seller’s markets (Kornai
1980) in which money was abundant and of low value; plans, rations, and the
willingness to wait counted for more than money in determining resource
entitlements. The money stock itself was supposed to be strictly segregated
into bank money for inter-firm transactions and cash money for wage
payments. The banks supplied money and credit to “follow” physical plans,
3and the planners monitored monetary flows mainly so as to practice “control
by the ruble,” i.e. to detect departures from physical directives (Garvy 1966;
Nove 1977, pp. 243-4). Given that firms could use money only for planned
purposes, there would appear to have been little incentive for them to acquire
additional holdings. In this view, money became an active influence on
allocation only when it stimulated either entrepreneurship in the unofficial
second economy, or corruption in the first, official one. In contrast we will
show that Soviet managers displayed an active thirst for money and allocated
considerable effort to getting it. When they got it they faced a choice: to
pocket it or use it on the firm’s behalf. With surprising frequency they
allocated it to support the firm’s objectives rather than their own.
In showing how this economy harnessed self-interest, we will draw a
distinction between the agent’s corruption and loyalty to her principal; we will
show that corruption was not always driven by disloyal motives, and that
managers made corrupt deals not only despite loyalty to the principal but
because of it, in order to support loyal activity and enterprise. The
phenomenon of the corrupt yet loyal manager is at the core of the mechanism
that aligned self-interest with the plan.
Our findings address issues of interest to both economists and historians.
For economists, we show that Soviet economic performance was affected not
only by the level of corruption but also by its quality, that is, how corrupt
incomes were used. This contributes to the literature on corruption and
development. Corruption is said to flourish in conditions of authoritarian rule,
which hinders accountability and promotes secrecy (Shleifer and Vishny 1993;
Ehrlich and Lui 1999). Corruption has been shown generally to reduce
investment and growth (Mauro 1995). However, the variation in growth rates
across countries that are similarly corrupt and authoritarian is substantial and
exceeds that among democracies (Sah 1991). Our model explains some of the
heterogeneity: whether or not corruption is bad for growth depends on how
corrupt incomes are used.
For historians we show how an instrument of policy, the level of plan
“tension,” influenced the quality of Soviet corruption and thus Soviet
economic performance. This contributes to the literature on the decay of the
Soviet economy. Empirical studies have shown that the underlying trend in
Soviet economic growth fell markedly during the 1970s (Harrison 1998b); at
the same time the scale of rent-seeking activities were increasing only
modestly (Kim 2003). This suggests that rising corruption was probably not
the cause of the slowdown. Instead, we will suggest that the exogenous factor
was a decline in plan tension that simultaneously determined the decline in
growth and an adverse shift not in the scale of corruption but in its quality:
namely, from loyal corruption to corruption that was disloyal.
The effects of “tension” in Soviet planning were first analysed by Holland
Hunter (1966) as a contribution to the theories of disequilibrium growth and
development that were fashionable at that time. The measurement of tension is
a difficult problem. It cannot be approximated by reported plan failures, for
example; we shall suggest that an increase in tension normally gave rise to an
increase in cheating that concealed any shortfalls arising. For this reason
evaluations of plan tension must rely principally on statements of belief and
intention. A reduction of plan tension that, according to Gertrude Schroeder
(1985: 47), apparently took place in the mid-1970s plays an important role in
4our story. It involved a moderate reduction in overall output growth and a near
halving of investment growth; these were based, according to Schroeder, on “a
determination to arrest the decline in the output/capital ratio, which had
accelerated in industry in 1971-75; a conviction that lower growth targets, by
easing the pressure on managers, would enable them to use resources more
efficiently and to improve the quality of products; a belief that slower growth
of investment would reduce plan tautness, slow accumulation of inventories,
and substantially improve efficiency in the investment process.”
Our paper is organized as follows. Part 1 describes the historical limits on
centralization of the Soviet command system. Specifically, Soviet managers
exercised discretion over the accounting prices used in planning and prices
and side payments that arose in decentralized contracting; they used this
discretion to improve the ratio of reward to effort directly, and also to reduce
effort indirectly by “siphoning” resources from the retail market. In Part 2 we
present a model of the Soviet firm in which there is no corruption and
producers allocate effort subject to a plan target and a resource constraint.
Parts 3 and 4 look at the Soviet firm’s use of corruption possibilities to relax
its resource constraint through siphoning. At each point we consider the
rationale for Soviet managers to engage in corruption and for planners to
tolerate or restrain their behaviour. In Part 5 we successfully test our model
using historical data. In Part 6 we reconsider the historical scope for disloyal
corruption. Part 7 concludes.
1. The Limits of Centralization
Standard models present the Soviet firm as a price-taker. According to Kornai
(1992: 148), however, there were too many prices for the price-fixing
authority to exercise this function effectively; instead, the authority “merely
endorse[d] prices set by the producer” after a process of “vertical bureaucratic
bargaining.” If producers were free to set prices, how would they set them?
Kornai neglected to go on to analyse the producer’s pricing decision.
Addressing this gap in the literature, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) proposed
a model in which the socialist firm faces an incentive to cut both price and
output relative to a market equilibrium in order to gain bribes. Given the price,
the firm sets output to maximise corrupt side payments. This approach, which
we will call the Shleifer-Vishny conjecture, sufficiently explains the
phenomena of widespread shortages and corruption in socialist systems, yet
does not sit well with the facts in other ways. First, Soviet firms worked
continually for higher, not lower prices. Much detailed information is now
available about how Soviet suppliers set industrial product prices (Harrison
1998a; Harrison and Simonov, 2000); even a single example of a firm asking
for a lower official price has yet to be found. Second, the Shleifer-Vishny
conjecture is framed by an assumption that the planner could control prices
perfectly if she wished, yet did not control quantities at all. The evidence that
we will bring to bear indicates that planners controlled both prices and
quantities, but imperfectly.
What was the significance of price-setting for the Soviet firm? According
to the stereotype, the firm in the Soviet command system was managed by
non-price regulation of quantities. The Russian archives show us, however,
that most targets that mattered in the Soviet economy were nominally defined.
The most important control figures decided by the Politburo, the annual
5investment plan and the defence budget, including the plan for military
procurements from industry, were fixed in rubles (Harrison 1998a, 2001: 99-
100; Gregory 2001: 17-18; Davies, 2001: 64-6). So were most supply quotas
that were binding on production ministries and enterprises.
Centralized supply planning required a mechanism to prevent producers
from satisfying ruble quotas by inflation rather than with real output. This
mechanism was the system of plan prices. Supposedly the plan price of each
product was fixed for the period of the plan. The anchor for each plan price
was the “factory” price officially approved by the centre in some past year,
usually on the basis of reported actual direct costs plus an allowance for
overheads. The motive for the producer to fulfil the plan then arose because
her reward was formed by the degree of fulfilment based on reported real
output multiplied by the plan price.
The authorities usually had enough information to prevent producers from
adopting an openly inflated plan price for a given product, which would have
broken explicit rules in observable ways. Producers could inflate the overall
level of plan prices covertly, however, by exploiting gaps in planners’
information about the product assortment and product quality (Harrison
1998a; 2000). Arbitrary variations in price/effort ratios across the assortment
created one opportunity for this: by shifting the proportions of output towards
products that were priced advantageously producers could push up the average
level of plan prices although there was no change in any particular price.
Another opportunity was represented by the modification of existing and
introduction of new products. When products were upgraded the producer
could claim a plan price increase that was supposedly based on the quality
improvement, so that the price/quality ratio was kept stable. But the planners
evaluated quality change on the basis of the producer’s costs and the
producer’s justification, not the consumer’s willingness to pay; the latter was
meaningless anyway in a shortage economy. When new products were
introduced subsequent to the base year for plan prices a benchmark plan price
for that product had to be established from scratch, and planners based this on
the actual unit costs that the producer now currently reported. Thus for both
modified and new products the producer held the initiative in price-setting. In
summary, producers used product change to exert upward pressure on the
average level of plan prices; they inflated the nominal costs at which new and
upgraded products were priced, and then they skewed the assortment towards
these newer products. But the pressure was unseen and the inflation was
hidden since it was always justified by quality claims.
Implicitly the inflationary pressure was not costless or limitless. To keep
the pressure up producers had to play the game of product innovation. They
had to modify their product lines continuously, whether the modifications
were fundamental or phoney, and whether or not they were truly useful to the
purchaser; if not useful, Berliner (1976, pp. 375-80) called it “simulated”
innovation. They had to persuade the planners that the claimed modifications
were useful regardless of the truth, bearing in mind that in the shortage
economy the producers themselves could not know and the consumers might
not care. The argumentation and the staging of innovation in support of it
diverted company time and effort from production. From the firm’s
standpoint, however, an increase in the effort that concealed inflation lowered
productive obligations on the firm by more than itself, and so yielded a net
6private gain up to a point. It is easy to think that the planners required
disproportionately more argumentation to overlook each extra increment of
hidden inflation, so that the concealment of inflation was characterized by
diminishing returns.
Estimates of the scale of hidden inflation in Soviet industrial statistics vary
with the methodologies used to evaluate quality and assortment. With regard
to the early period of Soviet industrialization Harrison (2000) concluded that
our best figure for hidden inflation in Soviet plan prices across industry from
1928 to 1955 lies between 150 and 200 percent; this includes a figure of 100
to 160 percent for machinery products in the period from 1937 to 1955. For
the more recent period we can disaggregate hidden inflation across branches
of industry from 1951 to 1987 as the excess of Soviet index numbers for the
gross value of output at plan prices over CIA estimates that were designed
specifically to strip the hidden inflation from the Soviet official figures. These
are shown in table 1.
Table 1. Real Growth and Hidden Inflation in Soviet Industry by Branch, 1951
to 1987
Real output growth,
per cent per year
Hidden
inflation,
per cent
per yearCIA Soviet
(1) (2) (3)
Machinery 5.6 11.2 5.6
Chemicals 7.8 10.6 2.8
Wood, pulp, and paper 3.2 5.2 2.0
Construction materials 7.0 9.0 2.0
Light industry 4.3 5.4 1.1
Ferrous metals 5.2 6.3 1.1
Electric power 8.1 8.9 0.8
Food industry 5.1 5.8 0.7
Fuels 5.5 5.6 0.1
Sources and Notes. Columns 1and 2 are from CIA (1990a), 37. Column 3 is
column 2 minus column 1.
The CIA methodology has been exhaustively described in many
publications (CIA 1982, 1990a,b). While not above criticism it remains the
best attempt at an extraordinarily difficult and complex task (e.g. Maddison
1998; Kontorovich 2003; Kudrov 2003). According to the table, hidden
inflation was highest in machinery at 5.6 per cent annually, and almost non-
existent in fuels.
Soviet firms used their influence on price-setting not only to fool the
planners but also to extract unplanned revenues from purchasers. The
documentary evidence on this is plentiful and clear cut. Stalin’s Politburo took
the inflationary propensities of producers for granted; they determined and at
times limited the annual investment plan, for example, believing that an
ambitious plan fixed in rubles could be partly eroded in real terms by higher
construction costs: the building industry would respond to a larger budget by
raising costs above estimate prices (Gregory 2001; Davies 2001).
7Records of bargains struck at lower levels provide further evidence that
suppliers’ preferences for product prices were always inflationary. In contrast
to the firm portrayed by Shleifer and Vishny that gained from a lower price of
output, it was typical for Soviet firms to try to push factory prices upward
towards the market-clearing level.
The opportunity for inflation arose when suppliers and users negotiated the
decentralized contracts that translated aggregate ministerial plans into firm-
specific delivery obligations (Kroll 1986; Harrison and Simonov 1998; Belova
2001b; Belova and Gregory 2002). According to Belova and Gregory it suited
planners and suppliers alike that centralized plans were issued in a highly
aggregated form; this freed planners from responsibility for issuing specific
assignments and gave suppliers freedom of action in deciding how to meet
them. In the context of a seller’s market the outcome was a ritual played out
each year between ardent grooms (purchasers) and reluctant brides (suppliers)
that became known as the annual “contracts campaign.”
Decentralized contracting allowed suppliers to use several stratagems to
extract advantage from potential purchasers. As a result purchasers often paid
for output above the rate set by officially established factory prices. In the
defence industry, for example, Harrison and Simonov (2000) found
unauthorized price increases in contracts for established products together
with demands for contracts in which prices of new products were specified
“provisionally” and subject to review in the light of actual costs, demands for
illegal advance payments, and a variety of strategic actions that supported
these demands: exaggeration of production costs, withholding of evidence
concerning costs, refusal to permit the verification of costs, delaying coming
to terms until well into the contract period, and refusal to come to an
agreement at all unless concessions were made on the contract price.
Since Kornai (1980) much theorizing about command systems has started
from the socialist firm’s soft budget constraint. Its financial shortfalls would
ultimately be made up from fiscal or quasi-fiscal sources. If so, why did firms
invest so much effort in extracting liquidity from purchasers? The answer
appears to be that managers set a high value on liquidity that was above the
plan and, not having a planned use, could be used in a discretionary way.
What were the uses of discretionary cash? Managers behaved corruptly not
just for private embezzlement as Shleifer and Vishny supposed, but also to
help the enterprise fulfil its plan (Belova 2001a). With cash at their disposal
they could finance side payments to their own workers and to unofficial
tolkachi (supply agents), and also “siphon” needed but unplanned resources
away from the retail market. Here we focus on siphoning.
The idea of firms’ siphoning from the retail market is not as strange as
may appear at first sight. Of course the retail market did not supply firms with
specialized producer goods such as metal-cutting machine tools, road or rail
trucks, steel ingots, or nonferrous castings. But many general-purpose goods
and services that were planned for consumer supply could also be used in
production: transport services, fuel and power supplies, information and
communication technology, light automobiles and parts, electrical components
and fittings, building materials, furniture, and office supplies. These were the
commodities over which firms competed with households in the retail market.
Siphoning plays an essential role in the theory of the soft budget
constraint. Specifically it solves the riddle posed by Shleifer and Vishny
8(1992): “In Kornai’s model,” they wrote, “it is not so much that goods are
underpriced, but that the income of the buyers is effectively infinite. This
model may be appropriate for some intermediate goods. But households face
hard budget constraints, and therefore the systematic shortages of many
consumer goods remain a puzzle.” In fact a soft budget constraint for firms
could result in shortages for consumers if firms’ demand for inputs spilled
over into retail outlets.
This idea had long been floated in the Sovietological literature (Kaser
1975; Birman 1980; Kornai 1980). However, the existence of siphoning
remained conjectural, especially since it required firms to be able to mobilize
unauthorized purchasing power. Even if siphoning occurred its scale and
significance remained doubtful. If it was significant, it was unclear why the
authorities tolerated it.
More recently Qian (1994), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), and Kim
(2002) provided the pieces necessary to solve this puzzle. Dewatripont and
Maskin showed how centralization of credit leads to a soft budget constraint in
the context of sunk costs and contract renegotiation. Qian showed that when
state-owned enterprises compete with households for goods that may be used
in both consumption and production, prices below the clearing level may
improve efficiency by allowing household consumption to crowd out some
bad projects that would otherwise proceed. Finally, Kim showed from postwar
archival records that Soviet firms and budgetary organizations did engage in
siphoning, that their demand spilled over into the retail market through
unauthorized channels in addition to some that were officially sanctioned, and
that siphoning made a substantial contribution to repressed inflation and a
growing monetary overhang in the Soviet retail market.
Kim (2002) found that the siphoning of consumer goods was prevalent in
the Soviet era. Enterprises’ supposedly “passive” money was used to purchase
consumer goods without official authorization. Archival data of the Soviet
family budget surveys from 1969 to 1990 show that the consumer goods
purchased using enterprises’ “passive” money averaged 21.3% of total retail
turnover of consumer goods. The scale of siphoning tended to rise over the
period, from 16% of total retail turnover of consumer goods in 1969 to 23%
and 26% in 1980 and 1989 respectively. However, this does not mean that
siphoning was absent in earlier periods, and its most important statistical trace
can be found in all periods of the history of the command system. This was the
excess of household spending over income found whenever government
statisticians computed the balance (Holzman 1960; Hanson 1968); the excess
arose because unauthorized institutional purchases in the retail market were
hidden in the totals for household consumption.
The pattern of siphoning was likely to reflect management objectives.
When faced with ambitious plan targets the manager was less likely to convert
discretionary cash into consumption and more likely to plough it back into
production. When planning tension was slackened, however, consumer
objectives could return to the fore. On this basis one might predict that a
relaxation of plan tautness would increase the siphoning of food and consumer
goods relative to that of goods that could also be used in production. Table 2
reports the extent of siphoning across types of commodities classified
according to their potential for intermediate use, in 1980, 1985, and 1989; over
these years plan tension fell, period by period. The table shows clearly that,
9while the siphoning of consumer goods increased, that of general purpose
commodities such as furniture and light automobiles that could also be used in
production stagnated or declined.
Table 2. The Magnitude of Siphoning of Food and Other Goods, 1980 to 1989
Used in Production? 1980 1985 1989 Change, 1980 to 1989
Clothing and footwear No 10.5 18.7 25.8 15.3
Tobacco No 43.5 46.1 52.9 9.4
Food No 16.8 17.5 19.2 2.4
Light automobiles Yes 36.0 40.9 33.9 −2.1
Furniture Yes 25.2 19.0 21.4 −3.8
Sources. Soviet family budget survey data; Goskomstat (no date); Goskomstat
(various years). The siphoning effect is measured by the excess of sales by the
government retail network over household expenditures on food, goods and
repairs from family budget data. Kim (2002, 2003) supplies more detail.
Cash was the instrument of siphoning, and siphoning should be considered
an established fact, but the full range of mechanisms through which Soviet
firms could mobilize cash or freely encash bank deposits are not completely
clear. The Soviet financial system (Garvy 1966) was designed to separate
monetary flows between two distinct circuits, one for anonymous cash and one
for traceable non-cash bank credits. In theory budgetary and state-owned
enterprises were allowed to use only non-cash credits in transactions with
other organizations; cash was restricted to a parallel circuit of household
transactions.
From the start, the realities of the financial system departed from this
design. Budget constraints were softened and credit conditions became chaotic
(Gregory and Tikhonov, 2000). It was widely believed that Soviet enterprises
had more cash in aggregate than the plan had authorized (Birman 1980;
Grossman 1986). This suggests that enterprises gained the above-plan liquidity
used for siphoning not only from each other in side payments but also from
breaking the central bank’s restrictions on cashing bank deposits.
The evidence on this is somewhat mixed (for different views compare
Holzman 1960, Granick 1987, Gregory 1990, Lushin 1990, Treml and
Alexeev 1994, Woodruff 1999, and Gregory and Tikhonov 2000). In our own
theorizing we assume that the firm cheated the planner through hidden
inflation and extracted hidden revenues from the customer, and did not cheat
the central bank. This assumption will not significantly affect our conclusions.
A model of the macroeconomic equilibrium, however, would need to
incorporate the government’s budget constraint and the balance sheet of the
central bank so as to account for overall liquidity growth.
2. Plan-Setting and Effort-Setting
In this section we develop a framework in which the firm cheats the planner
and behaves opportunistically but not corruptly. At this point it may be asked
why the firm did not try to corrupt the planner. The answer appears to be that
Stalin and his successors deliberately separated planners from management
responsibility and kept their numbers small to ensure their loyalty (Gregory
1990; Belova and Gregory 2002).
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In the Soviet command economy planners aimed to monitor real output for
each firm in each period. The firm’s target was its real gross output expressed
in plan rubles; this was calculated as a quantity vector q* multiplied by a
vector of official prices p–1 that applied in the previous base period. In
practice, however, planners could not effectively compel firms to fulfil the
plan at base-period prices. When products were changing, planners tried to
limit changes in product-unit prices to those that left the level of prices per
unit of characteristics unchanged. They could prohibit open inflation, but
continuous alterations in the product assortment and product characteristics
left planners unable to detect the hidden inflation associated with simulated
product innovation. In short, we define hidden inflation in relation to planners,
not consumers who knew what prices they faced. Inflation was concealed and
the planners were fooled when the firm pushed up product-unit prices faster
than the value to the user of the improvement in product characteristics, or
when product-unit prices remained constant despite unreported worsening of
product quality.
As a result the planners had to be satisfied ex post with any real output
vector q that, combined with a new current price vector p set by firms and
subject to planners’ limited scrutiny of price alterations, matched the ruble
total set by them ex ante. But it is simpler if we treat the firm’s average price
and quantity as scalars.
(1)  1
1 *q p q
p 
  
This equation is represented in Figure 1 by the unit-elastic PS or plan-setting
curve, which required q = q* when 1p p and there was no hidden inflation:
the vertical axis in the figure represents the true level of the official price,
including the inflation that the planners failed to detect, while the PS curve
shows the rate at which producers could trade hidden inflation for real output
while continuing to satisfy the plan. Similarly, the horizontal axis measures
not the output that was officially reported but true real output, corrected for the
exaggerated claims that producers made for the quality of their products in
order to fool the plan-setter.
Figure 1. Plan-Setting, Effort-Setting, and the Firm’s Equilibrium
A
p
p–1
ES
q
B
ES'
q*0
PS PS'
q*1
Along ES, effort is 0 .
Along ES', effort is 1 0  .
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We represent what happened when the planner increased tension by
shifting the PS curve rightward shift from q*0 to q*1 and to PS', requiring the
firm to achieve some higher level of true real output for given concealed
inflation so as to satisfy the plan.
From the firm’s point of view output was costly, but so was the
concealment of inflation, because both required the exertion of effort. Think of
the firm’s utility as based on its members’ wage income w and leisure :
(2) ( , ),u u w 
0 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0w ww w wu u u u u u        
where wu and u are the first derivatives of u with respect to w and
respectively, wwu and u are the second derivatives of u with respect to w
and respectively, wu  is the cross-derivative of u with respect to w and
and wu is the cross-derivative of u with respect to  and wthese
definitions of first and second derivatives are retained in other equations
below. The wage could assume two values: a fixed return w w if the firm
satisfied the planners’ target and otherwise nothing, 0w  . This is the
classical Soviet incentive scheme in a simplified form (Berliner 1952). We
assume that leisure and income interact, so the firm required at least some of
both. Berliner first noted the significance of a “quiet life” for the Soviet
enterprise. In order to have any income at all the firm had first to satisfy the
output target, and then it could also maximize leisure. The firm maximized
leisure subject to a resource constraint that we shall treat initially as hard:
(3) 1 0e i    
where e is productive effort, i is the effort required to simulate innovation and
so conceal inflation, and the firm’s initial time endowment is normalized to 1.
Finally, there were two technologies, one for the production of output a
and one for the concealment of inflation x. Production required effort to be
combined with capital k, but for now we will treat capital as an exogenous
resource. Inflation concealment required effort alone. In both activities, returns
to effort diminished:
(4) ( , ), 0, 0e eeq a k e a a  
(5) 1
1
( ), 0, 0i ii
p p x i x x
p



  
Then, for any given level of overall effort that it chose to set, the firm faced a
feasible set of combinations of real output and hidden inflation that was
concave to the origin (proposition 1: for propositions, proofs, and a list of
symbols see Appendix 1).
We call this the ES or effort-setting curve. For each firm and for every
production and concealment technology there was a family of ES curves, one
for each feasible level of effort. In Figure 1 the ES curve illustrates the
combinations of real output and hidden inflation that were feasible for a given
effort level λ0. As the firm set its effort level higher, say to λ1, the ES curve
expanded in all directions, say to ES' (proposition 2).
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Facing a given plan the firm’s problem was to allocate effort between
production and inflation concealment so that the plan was fulfilled and effort
was set at a minimum. In Figure 1 this point is found at A where the plan-
setter’s line PS is tangential to the lowest available effort-setter’s line, ES
corresponding with effort level λ0, and it sets the equilibrium values of real
output and hidden inflation simultaneously. The firm could also have satisfied
the planner with more real output and less hidden inflation, or with less real
output and more hidden inflation, but either of these would have required the
firm to shift its effort curve outward and cost more effort, say λ1 for ES'.
The figure also shows what happens when the planner increased tension,
right-shifting PS from q*0 to q*1. To continue to satisfy the plan the firm had
to move to the higher ES' curve defined by λ1. At the new equilibrium B there
would be less leisure and more real output, but diminishing returns to
productive effort made it inefficient for the firm to meet the higher plan only
by increasing real output. Some of the extra effort would go into fooling the
planners. In equilibrium real output rose by less than the change in q* and
there was also more hidden inflation than before.
Simple extensions of the model suggest conditions under which the
command system may break down. The system’s directors had to steer a
course between excessive liberalism and excessive harshness. First, suppose
the plan was set at a level that could not be fulfilled with any combination of
real output and hidden inflation given the firm’s hard resource constraint.
Producers would then prefer zero effort, reward, and utility to the welfare loss
resulting from trying and failing to fulfil the plan; there would be no hidden
inflation, but output would collapse to the origin. The turmoil induced by
Stalin’s Great Breakthrough and Mao’s Great Leap Forward comes to mind.
Second, if prices were fully liberalized within the command system producers
would use their new freedom to climb the PS curve, raising prices without
limit and cutting real output to a minimum. This time one thinks of the Soviet
economic collapse at the end of the 1980s (Harrison 2002).
3. Loyal Corruption
So far we have assumed that the enterprise was subject to a hard resource
constraint. In fact, while resources for production and consumption were
constrained in total for the economy as a whole, the resource constraint on the
individual firm could be softened by collecting corrupt revenues and recycling
them through siphoning, and so adding outside resources intended for
consumption to the production inputs officially allocated to the enterprise. Our
attempt to capture the outcome will resemble the Shleifer-Vishny story of the
bribe in some respects, but in our initial model the bribe is collected in order to
fulfil the plan, not to line pockets. The result is that, with plan-setting
unchanged, real output rises while both hidden inflation and insider effort fall;
the inflation experienced by consumers also rises, however.
Subsequently we will examine the implications of bribe-taking for
personal enrichment, or embezzlement. However, unlike Vishny and Shleifer
we do not regard embezzlement as the general case. We will draw a distinction
between corruption and disloyalty. All managers were potentially corrupt, but
only disloyal managers used the proceeds for personal enrichment; loyal
managers used them to fulfil the plan. Such loyalty was rational. In the vertical
administrative hierarchy managers were expected to invest in loyalty both
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upwards and downwards. Managers showed loyalty to their superiors for the
sake of their careers: to get promotion, they needed a record of plan fulfilment.
But this record also relied on meeting the needs of inferiors and maintaining
their cooperation, so managers also had to show loyalty to the workforce.
Consistent disloyalty in either direction, upward or downward, prejudiced
career aspirations. Since these loyalties could come into conflict successful
management involved complex balancing. Of course disloyal corruption that
was for personal enrichment also brought a return, but the value of the return
was less than might be thought since cash was often hard to spend on personal
consumption; this was both because of the seller’s market and also because of
the need to avoid attracting attention.
Belova (2001a) reports what she calls the “honest” manager’s dilemma,
but in this system no one was completely honest, so we will call it the
dilemma of the loyal manager. To fulfil the plan, the manager had to compete
for scarce supplies that the planners forgot, or promised but did not deliver. To
compete, she had to pay. Payments went to sideline suppliers of deficit
commodities, unofficial purchasing agents, and workers for the extra effort
required to make bricks without straw. We will analyse siphoning: so as to
augment their own productive stocks firms entered the retail market as
purchasers of commodities intended for sale to households for personal
consumption. For this purpose the loyal manager had to acquire discretionary
liquidity by creating revenues that were hidden from the planners. She got the
liquidity from her own purchasers by securing an above-list price, or advance
payment, or bribe, but, in distinction from the Shleifer-Vishny story, the bribe
was credited to the firm’s account.
First, rewrite the firm’s production function from equation (4), adding k
to represent the availability of an outside resource that substitutes perfectly for
the firm’s inside stocks of fixed and working capital:
(6) ( , ),q a k k e  
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0e k ee k k e k kek a a a a a a           
In order to get hold of k the firm requires hidden revenue for discretionary
use in the secondary market where commodities are traded that are of potential
intermediate use. This hidden revenue must be over and above the liquidity
officially allocated in the firm’s financial plan. The firm extracts this hidden
revenue in advance from consumers in its own product market: the hidden
revenue gathered in the previous period is used to add to the firm’s real
resources in the current period. The coexistence of regulated and market-
clearing prices in shortage economies is a well established historical fact that
can be rationalized in economic theory (Kim 1997) by reference to consumers’
heterogeneous valuations of time versus money.
Suppose the firm can capture some proportion of the gap between the
regulated and market-clearing price in the form of an advance payment, side
payment, or mark-up over its officially listed product price without being
detected; for simplicity we can set this proportion at 100 per cent without
affecting core results. The firm uses its hidden revenue as discretionary
purchasing power in the secondary market. How will siphoning affect the ES
curve? The result will be a new ES' curve that is still concave (proposition 3)
but right-shifted by comparison with the no-siphoning case (proposition 4).
For a baseline illustration, consider how the structure of the firm’s incentives
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is changed in what we will call the “single-transaction” case. The single
transaction begins in period –1 when the firm sells a commodity in return for a
side-payment and recycles it through siphoning to acquire k. The same
transaction ends in period 0 when the firm uses k to satisfy the plan-setter
and augment its utility, but the firm makes no provision for repeated siphoning
of resources to be used in period 1. Thus the single transaction takes two
periods to complete, but the only decision we analyse is the firm’s
optimization within the current period.
Figure 2. Siphoning: A Single Transaction
This case is illustrated in Figure 2. Initially the firm was subject to a hard
resource constraint. Given plan-setting, the firm was in equilibrium with the
solid effort-setting curve ES at point A; leisure is 0 , say. Softening its
resource constraint through siphoning enabled the firm to produce more for
given hidden inflation and given effort. The dashed ES' curve illustrates the
production-augmenting effect of siphoning with effort held still at 0 . Since
ES' lay partly outside the firm’s PS curve, it was not efficient for the firm to
maintain effort at this level. As long as plan-setting remained unchanged, the
firm would prefer to cut effort to a lower level, say 1 , yielding an ES" line
that, with augmented productive capital, was skewed downward and rightward
from the no-siphoning ES curve and touched PS at B, a point showing more
real output and less hidden inflation.
In short, behaving corruptly to soften her resource constraint helped the
loyal manager to fulfil the plan with less effort, less hidden inflation, and more
true real output than would have been possible otherwise. This result suggests
that not only the firm gained; there was also less fooling of the planners, for
whom there was a clear rationale to turn a blind eye to the rule-breaking
involved since in the outcome the plan was fulfilled more honestly.
The welfare implications are ambiguous, however. Consumers would have
been better off in the current period in terms of real consumption because real
output had increased; as long as production finished at the end of the current
period we can assume that all goods produced currently were consumed. But it
is not clear that this period’s consumption would have risen by enough to
compensate for the consumption lost in the last period by being recycled back
q
p
p–1
A
B
ES
ES"
PS
ES'
Along ES, effort is 0 .
Along ES', effort is 0 .
Along ES'', effort is 1 0  .
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into production. This depends on the efficiency with which the firm captured
hidden revenues and converted them into additional inputs, and on the firm’s
initial endowment; a firm that started capital-poor would make more
productive use of siphoning.
For consumers subject to a cash constraint the effect of siphoning on prices
must also be taken into account. Consumers would have paid less for supplies
in the current period because of less hidden inflation but in the previous period
some of them would have paid more for supplies because of a combination of
higher free market prices and covert side payments.
Next, we show that the rise in plan tension could have induced enterprises
to use siphoned resources for higher output rather than effort reduction; thus,
consumer welfare was more likely to improve when siphoning was combined
with a rise in plan tension.
Figure 3 shows a possible outcome. The firm’s capacity gain from
siphoning, controlling for effort, is the shift from ES to ES'. The increase in
plan tension is the shift from q*0 to q*1 and from PS to PS'. In the case of a
corrupt but loyal manager this increase would exactly capture the firm’s
additional resources, moving its equilibrium from A to B. At B, effort is the
same as at A. Thus, the increase in plan tension has prevented the firm from
using corrupt gains to augment its leisure. Real output has risen, though less
than in proportion to the rise in plan tension, and there is also more hidden
inflation.
Figure 3. A Rise in Plan Tension With Siphoning
4. Repeated Siphoning
The Shleifer-Vishny model prompts the question whether a corrupt supplier
could gain by restricting output. To address this question we go beyond the
case of a single transaction. In the single-transaction case the value of side
payments was fixed beforehand. Effort was not optimized to supply the market
in such a way as to secure further side payments as a basis for repeated
siphoning. Side-payments depended on the gap between the market-clearing
price and the official price. When siphoning is continuous this gap can be
determined simultaneously with the effort-setting decision since market-
clearing and official prices both decline, but at differing rates, as real output
rises. The official price varies inversely with output along the PS curve, the
q
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PS' Along ES, effort is 0 .
Along ES', effort is 0 .
q*0 q*1
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latter being unit price-elastic. The market-clearing price varies inversely with
output along the demand curve as the balance in the market shifts from seller
to buyer. We assume a market demand curve as follows, linear for the sake of
illustration:
(7) ˆ , , 0p z q z     .
Consider how the firm’s hidden revenues would have changed as real
output increased. We observe that the firm’s hidden revenues depended on the
relative elasticities of the PS and market demand curves. The PS curve, which
could also be termed the planner’s demand curve, determined open revenues
but was unit-elastic: the firm had to achieve a fixed total planned revenue,
which in this context became a lump-sum tax. Assume for simplicity that the
firm succeeded in extracting all the side payments that the market could bear;
then, the market demand curve determined the firm’s total revenue. Being
downward-sloping and linear, its elasticity fell as output rose. Where the
elasticity of the market demand curve equalled unity the firm’s total revenue
was maximized and, since its planned revenues were a lump sum, its net
hidden revenues were also maximized.
Figure 4. Hidden Revenues
In Figure 4 the siphoning firm operates in the “shortage” region between
q and q where the market-clearing price exceeds the official price; it is also a
necessary condition that both prices exceed the baseline plan price 1p . In this
region, assuming that the firm is able to extract the market price on its total
output, the gap between the PS and D (market-demand) curves represents the
firm’s hidden revenue per unit of output. It maximizes its total hidden
p
q q
q0
D
MR
z
2p z
2q z 
12z p p 
Between q and q the market-
clearing price exceeds the official
price and the firm can siphon.
PS
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revenues midway between q and q , which is also the point where marginal
revenue becomes zero and the marginal revenue curve, drawn with slope
1 2 , meets the quantity axis (drawn here at 0p  , not 1p p ). On either
side of this point hidden revenues diminish, falling to zero at q and q .
How is the ES curve affected when side payments are endogenous? The
result is a bubble on the ES curve in the region between q and q . In the
single-transaction case (Figure 2) the whole ES curve was right-shifted in
favour of higher real output. When siphoning is repeated the displacement of
the ES surface is limited to the shortage region and is upward and variable,
reaching its maximum extent at the level of output where hidden revenues are
maximized. This drift is determined by the PS and D curves alone, and there is
therefore a bubble on each member of the family of ES curves in the region
between q and q .
How does repeated siphoning influence the PS-ES equilibrium? For
simplicity we assume that the relationship between hidden revenues and
resources siphoned becomes linear with constant returns. Siphoning is
maximized where hidden revenues are maximized. Thus, over the output range
where the linear market demand curve is more elastic than the PS curve and
hidden revenues are increasing, the siphoning bubble makes the ES' curve
flatter, and conversely. Under continuous siphoning, therefore, the downward
slope of the ES' curve varies directly with that of the market demand curve.
If ES' was made flatter then the siphoning equilibrium tended to shift in
favour of higher output; conversely, if steeper the siphoning equilibrium
would have tended towards higher hidden inflation (proposition 5). The two
cases are illustrated in Figure 5. In each panel point A marks the no-siphoning
equilibrium. On the left, Panel 1 shows the case where, with a low value of π,
the market demand curve was still elastic at the no-siphoning equilibrium;
then for given output the ES' curve would become flatter, and the siphoning
equilibrium tended to shift towards higher output. Intuitively, the firm that
faced elastic market demand lost hidden revenue by restricting output. Instead,
up to a point dictated by diminishing returns to effort and liquidity the firm
produced extra output, took the extra hidden revenue, and used it to buy extra
inputs. For insider effort set at 01  the ES curve expanded to ES'. This effort
was above the efficient level, so the firm cut effort to the lower ES" where
effort was 11  and 1 0  . The outcome was an equilibrium at B with less
hidden inflation and more real output.
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Figure 5. Repeated Siphoning
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The welfare implications of continuous siphoning for consumers in the
case of a relatively flat market demand curve are again ambiguous. Consumers
could enjoy higher consumption, as in the single transaction case, but only if
the volume of true real output increased by enough to compensate for the loss
of consumption due to continuous siphoning. As for the aggregate price level
that consumers faced, this could go up or down depending upon three factors:
the decrease in hidden inflation compared to the no-siphoning case, the excess
of the market-clearing price over the official price, and the proportion of
consumers paying the market-clearing price.
Panel 2, on the right of Figure 5, shows the converse case. With a higher
value of π the market demand curve was already inelastic at the no-siphoning
equilibrium; then for given output the ES' curve would be made steeper, and
the siphoning equilibrium tended towards higher concealed inflation. The firm
facing inelastic demand could raise hidden revenue from side payments by
restricting output. This case is more consonant with the stylized facts of a
shortage economy proposed by Shleifer and Vishny. But in our case the firm,
while restricting output to increase hidden revenues, still had to satisfy the
planners. It did so by diverting the effort released by external resources
siphoned from the secondary market to hiding inflation rather than producing
output. The outcome at C was more hidden inflation and less real output.
Further, successive increases in plan tension would no longer necessarily
shift the firm’s equilibrium towards higher levels of real output. This is
because the firm’s point of maximum hidden revenues was fixed by the
market demand curve. In Figure 5, other things being equal, a rise in plan
tension shifted the firm’s no-siphoning equilibrium to the right, and at the
same time the probability rose that the no-siphoning equilibrium would drift to
the right of the point where the firm’s hidden revenues were maximized. At
this point the firm might rationally prefer to curtail any further increase in real
output that would drive down hidden revenues and reduce siphoned resources.
This placed an ultimate limit on the ability of the planner to raise plan tension
so as to maintain productive effort and raise real output when siphoning was
repeated.
Finally, when market demand was inelastic the implications of continuous
siphoning for consumer welfare were clearly negative: consumers became
worse off in terms of both consumption and the price level. Resources
siphoned away from consumption resulted in lower output; not only did the
official price increase but, in addition, some consumers also had to pay the
higher market-clearing price. This aspect of our model yields two testable
predictions.
5. Two Tests
Prediction 1. Other things being equal, hidden inflation should have been
inversely correlated with the price elasticity of market demand at the firm
level. Specifically, we can rewrite equation (5) for the case of repeated
siphoning in the form:
(8)  1
1
, , 0, 0
j jj j X
j
p p p X p p
p 


 
   
 
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where the dependent variable is the inflation concealed by the jth firm, j is
the elasticity of market demand for the firm’s product, and jX is a vector of
industry-level fixed effects that determine the firm’s private effort costs of
operating the concealment technology.
Prediction 2. Other things being equal, the change in hidden inflation
associated with a given change in plan tension over time should have varied
directly with the firm-level price elasticity of market demand. Specifically, we
showed that the downward slope of the ES' curve would vary directly with
that of the market demand curve. The flatter was the ES' bubble at the
siphoning equilibrium, the more a given reduction in plan tension was likely to
reduce hidden inflation.
Here are three problems: to observe inflation that has been hidden, to
identify the elasticity of the firm’s market demand curve, and to control for
fixed effects across industries. In Table 1 we measured hidden inflation across
nine branches of industry over the period 1951 to 1987 as the excess of Soviet
volume index numbers over CIA estimates that were designed to strip hidden
inflation from the Soviet official figures. These are the figures used to measure
hidden inflation along the vertical axis of Figure 7.
For the elasticity of demand and the effort cost of inflation concealment
across industries we provide some informed guesswork. We set the effort cost
of inflation concealment low in machinery where rapid product innovation
was intrinsic to technological change throughout the economy, and in light
industry where consumers placed a premium on novelty, high in electric
power, ferrous metals, and fuels where standardization and product
homogeneity were easily monitored and at a premium, and at an intermediate
level in other branches (for further support see our note to Figure 6).
As for elasticities, we observe the factors underlying the firm’s elasticity
of demand in three different ways (for further support see Appendix 2). First,
the structure of each industry determined the buyer’s ability to choose among
alternative suppliers within the industry; the buyer could shop around among
official and unofficial suppliers to a varying extent, and the opportunity for
this arose in the contract stage of plan implementation that has already been
described. Second, the buyer had more or less scope to substitute within each
industry’s range of products. Third, the frustrated buyer had varying choices
among the substitutes for each industry’s products available from other
industries, unofficial markets in the “second” economy, or the buyer’s own in-
house sideline production. We take the median of the three resulting indexes
to estimate the relative elasticity of the demand curve facing the individual
firm in each industry; in Figure 6 we classify it as low, medium or high along
the horizontal axis. We conclude that price elasticity was high in the light and
food industries, low in machinery, chemicals, and electric power, and medium
in other branches.
Figure 6 shows that, taking the postwar period as a whole and controlling
for concealment costs, hidden inflation did rise across industries as firm-level
demand became more inelastic. This conforms to our first prediction.
To capture the effects of a change in plan tension we measure the change
in hidden inflation across industries comparing the low-tension 1980s with the
higher-tension 1950s and 1960s. As Figure 7 would suggest, the annual rate of
hidden inflation in industry as a whole fell over this period by 1 percentage
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point, a result that might surprise those who see Soviet postwar economic
history in terms only of rising disorder, but is entirely consistent with our
framework. A stronger test is the pattern of decline across industries. Figure 7
shows that the change in hidden inflation associated with the fall in plan
tension did vary directly with the price elasticity of market demand. This
conforms to our second prediction.
Figure 6. Hidden Inflation, Market Demand Elasticity, and Inflation
Concealment Cost in Soviet Industry by Branch, 1951 to 1987
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Sources and Notes: Reading across the figure in columns from top to bottom,
starting from the left, observations are machinery; chemicals; ferrous metals;
electric power; wood, pulp, and paper; construction materials; fuels; the light
industry; the food industry. Hidden inflation rates are from Table 1. Demand
elasticities are from Appendix 2, Table A.1, column 1, with 0 = “low,” 1 =
“medium,” and 2 = “high.” We grade inflation concealment costs “low,”
“medium,” and “high” according to the relative opportunity for “simulated”
innovation and direct falsification of output returns in different branches of
Soviet industry, based on our reading of a number of classic works including
Hodgman (1954), Grossman (1960), Kaplan and Moorsteen (1960),
Moorsteen (1962), Nutter (1962), and CIA (1979) in addition to more recent
studies by Khanin (1991), Harrison (1996), Kudrov (1997), and Harrison
(2000).
To summarize: an increase in plan tension would reduce the scope for both
corruption and siphoning. This was evident from Figure 4: the firm may
extract a net surplus of hidden revenues only when market demand exceeds
planned revenues. An increase in the firm’s planned output reduces the gap
between the two and so limits the firm’s corruption possibilities. When
siphoning was repeated and firms responded to the resulting possibilities with
adverse effects on real output, regardless of whether managers were loyal or
disloyal, tautening the plan was a mechanism to limit corruption and
corruption-oriented behaviour. Conversely, reducing plan tension expanded
the scope for both corruption and disloyalty.
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Figure 7. Change in Hidden Inflation, 1980 to 1987 over 1951 to 1970, and
Market Demand Elasticity in Soviet Industry by Branch,
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Sources and Notes. Reading across the figure in columns from top to bottom,
starting from the left, observations are ferrous metals; electric power;
chemicals; machinery; fuels; wood, pulp, and paper; construction materials;
the food industry; the light industry. Sources are as Figure 6. The change in
hidden inflation is the annual average for 1981 to 1987 subtracted from the
annual average for 1951 to 1970; the latter is computed from the source.
6. Disloyalty
In this economy all managers were self-interested, and all managers were
corruptible, but the manager we have described so far remained loyal. By
accepting illegal side-payments and disbursing them via the siphoning
mechanism, she fulfilled the plan and while saving effort. This manager was
therefore loyal simultaneously to superiors and to the workforce.
Not all managers were loyal, however. From our present knowledge we
cannot easily work out what was the balance of loyal versus disloyal
behaviour at any given point in time. Even at the time, principals themselves
could not easily distinguish the unofficial deals that agents made to fulfil the
plan from those that lined their pockets. From the evidence of illegal dealing
recorded by the courts and extra-judicial investigative organs of the Stalin era,
Eugenia Belova (2001) has shown that, faced with the same facts of illegal
dealing, officials could disagree over whether to see a criminal act or a loyal
one. A recent study of the last Soviet-era anti-corruption drive (Duhamel
2004) suggests that disloyal agents would always claim loyal motivation, and
sometimes the investigators themselves did not want to know because they
had a private or political agenda of their own. Decades after the event we are
unlikely to be able to determine whether loyal acts outweighed disloyal ones
in some numerical way.
In our framework the absolute quality of Soviet corruption is not what
matters. What is important is its relative quality: whether it tended to be more
aligned to the aims of the Soviet state than would be normal in market
economies, and whether the relaxation of Soviet plan discipline in the 1970s
caused it to become less aligned.
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Here we consider briefly the implications of disloyalty. A manager might
choose to be either completely or partly disloyal. A completely disloyal
manager embezzled all side payments for personal enrichment, so there would
have been no siphoning and the firm’s resource constraint would remain hard.
The fact of widespread siphoning implies that complete disloyalty was not
typical. We suggest that in practice the scope for managerial disloyalty was
limited by workers’ and planners’ responses.
To support this we specify the distribution of information about disloyal
behaviour by managers as follows. Suppose that information about particular
disloyal acts was only available to other agents within the firm. Above the
firm, there was information only about the general incidence of corruption
possibilities. If the manager was disloyal the workers knew, but the planners
could only suspect.
With respect to the workforce the manager with a disloyal propensity
faced the following problem. She could sufficiently maintain her reputation
upward by fulfilling the plan. But to fulfil the plan the manager needed the
cooperation of the workers, who would have knowledge of her disloyalty. The
workers might threaten to withhold effort, or alternatively to disclose her
wrong-doing, to induce her to share the gains from corruption. In principle this
sharing might be done in two ways. First, the corrupt manager might distribute
part of the bribe income directly to the workforce in cash, but on our
understanding of the context and evidence this was detectable, therefore
dangerous, and seldom done. Instead, managers bought cooperation by
transforming cash rents into additional resources through siphoning and
sharing the gain with the workers in the form of leisure. As a result, for a
given plan insiders’ effort fell. In this form rent-sharing was less visible to
higher-level audit or even looked “good.” In short, complete disloyalty was
not feasible: self-interested managers were always at least partly loyal.
Consider the problem of the same disloyal manager in relation to plan-
setters. Plan-setters did not know firms’ intrinsic capacity, or the extent of
disloyalty, or the extent to which bribes were recycled into siphoning. They
knew there was corruption, that siphoning might occur as a result, that
siphoning enlarged firms’ capacity, and that even disloyal managers would
rationally choose to recycle some bribes into siphoning. They knew therefore
that when siphoning arose the effort level and the utilization of capacity would
tend to fall with an unchanged plan. Thus they would rationally respond to
information about increased corruption possibilities by tautening the plan.
The disloyal manager wished to pocket the gain herself. But she still had to
conserve her reputation with plan-setters by fulfilling the plan. Since the
planners’ knowledge of corruption possibilities led them to set a higher plan,
the disloyal manager now had to get the workers to work harder. For this she
needed the workers’ cooperation, and this forced her to share the proceeds of
corruption with the workers by engaging in siphoning to enlarge capacity and
limit effort. In short, when managers were corrupt raising plan tension was a
mechanism to limit disloyalty. But the converse was also the case: reducing
plan tension could promote embezzlement by corrupt managers. This result
establishes a clear mechanism that links the spread of disloyal corruption
through the Soviet economy in the 1970s (Grossman 1977, 1979) with the
simultaneous reduction of growth targets (Schroeder 1985).
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7. Conclusions
We have analysed the Soviet firm as a price-setter that interacted with a plan-
setter and an external market to determine real output, hidden inflation,
corruption, and siphoning simultaneously. In the case of a single siphoning
transaction we have found a clear rationale for Soviet planners to tolerate
corruption and siphoning. Managers allocated resources that were gained
corruptly to produce more real output with less hidden inflation and fulfil the
plan more honestly as a result. Self-interested managers, however corrupt,
always remained at least partly loyal to the goals of planners and workers.
Moreover, by increasing plan tension planners could induce disloyal managers
to recycle more hidden revenues into production. Thus, tautening the plan
limited managerial disloyalty. The implications for the welfare of Soviet
consumers are ambiguous, however.
We have qualified these results for the case of siphoning repeated in
continuous time. In this case higher real output was not the invariable
consequence. When siphoning was continuous the consequences for the
welfare of consumers were less likely to be positive. But raising plan tension
appears to have remained an effective mechanism for limiting the scope for
corruption and adverse corruption-oriented behaviour.
Our findings also reflect on the relationship between Soviet corruption and
shortage. On the basis of the evidence we reject the Shleifer-Vishny (1992)
conjecture that the shortage economy was organized with the intention of
distributing bribes to individuals. Rather, the shortage economy had a by-
product, corruption, that planners tolerated for their own purposes. Corruption
did create scope for disloyal agents to line their pockets, but it could also help
to align the objectives of suppliers with those of planners. Planners could
influence the scope for both corruption and disloyalty by manipulating the
degree of plan tension; it seems likely that reductions in Soviet plan tension in
the 1970s contributed to the privatization of corruption rents in the economy.
We suggest that historians may find the same relationship between Soviet
corruption and growth that we have analysed in other cases. Wherever
developmental states have imposed partial centralization, firms have pursued
multiple objectives. When this has happened they have been subjected to
regulation. Regulated enterprises can then choose to allocate resources
between adding value, augmenting leisure, seeking bribes, and influencing the
regulator. When the economy was only partly centralized they could attract
external resources by means that would qualify as corrupt. These additional
resources could in turn be applied to the purposes of personal enrichment or to
those of the enterprise itself. Our reasoning implies that, controlling for the
level of corruption, economic performance depended on how corrupt incomes
were used. An authoritarian regime that tolerated corruption conditionally
upon economic performance could reduce the scope for private enrichment
and maintain growth by encouraging the siphoning of resources back into
production. This may explain why some countries have experienced rapid
economic growth under regimes that are both authoritarian and corruption.
25
Appendix 1. The Effort-Setting Curve
Symbols
a production technology
b firm’s hidden revenue
e effort in production
i effort in concealment of inflation
k capital
 leisure
p official price
pˆ market-clearing price
 (absolute) slope of the market demand curve for output
q real output
r share of output sold at the market-clearing price
t plan target
x inflation concealment technology
Plan-Setting and Effort-Setting
Consider a firm that operates subject to two constraints. The first constraint is
the PS or plan-setting line: its real output at official prices must match its
target in rubles at plan prices, 1 *p q  , deflated by the current official price
level:
(A1)  1
1 *q p q
p 
   .
Second is a resource constraint, where the firm’s time endowment is
normalized to 1:
(A2) 1 0e i     .
The firm has two activities. Production requires capital and effort. To begin
with only effort is variable; effort is also subject to diminishing returns:
(A3) 1 , 0 1q a k e       .
The concealment of inflation in the price at which the firm’s plan target is to
be fulfilled requires only effort, again subject to diminishing returns:
(A4) 10,
1
1





ix
p
pp ,
where p is concealed from the plan-setter.
For reasons given in the text the firm’s problem, given the plan-setter’s
line, is reduced to allocating effort between production and inflation
concealment so as to fulfil the plan with minimum overall effort. This point is
found where PS, the plan-setting line (equation A1), is tangential to the lowest
effort-setting line or ES (from A2, A3, and A4):
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(A5)
1
1 1
1
1 p pq a k
x p




 

 
  
        
  
.
Proposition 1. The tangential line of the ES curve is negative. In addition, the
ES curve is strictly concave: the marginal rate of substitution decreases as p
increases.
Proof:
The partial derivative of q with respect to p is less than zero:
11 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 11 p p p pq a k
p x p x p x p

 

 



  
  
 
                               
  
.
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










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A , and 1
1
0p pB
x p


 
  
 
.
Then
11
1
1
q a k A B
p x p
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 




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

p
q .
Moreover, the second derivative of q with respect to p is also negative:














 








 



























1
21
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2 111)1(
px
BA
px
kapp
px
BA
px
ka
p
q





 







,
where 10and10   . Thus
2
2 0
q
p



, suggesting that the ES curve is
strictly concave to the origin.
Proposition 2. A reduction in leisure expands the ES curve; the new curve lies
outside the old curve at all points.
Proof:
This proposition is investigated through the effects on the p- and q-intercepts
of the ES curve arising from a decline in the value of  . The p-intercept is
found by setting 0q in equation A5:
(A6)  1 1 1p p x



     
 
.
Similarly the q-intercept is found from equation A5 by setting 1 pp :
(A7)  1 1q a k



    .
Other things being equal, when  declines, both the p- and q-intercepts
increase: the ES curve expands in all directions.
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Let the firm siphon capital-augmenting resources k from the retail
market so its production function becomes:
(A8)  
1
q a k k e



     .
The ES curve with siphoning (the ES' curve) becomes:
(A9)  
1
1 1
1
1 p pq a k k
x p






 
            
  
.
Effort-Setting and Siphoning: a Single Transaction
Proposition 3. The ES' curve is concave to the origin: the marginal rate of
substitution decreases as p increases.
Proof:
Because k is predetermined, its influence on equation A9 compared with
equation A5 is purely scalar. Therefore, the proof suggested for proposition 1
is also applicable to this proposition. In other words, the signs of the first and
second derivatives of q with respect to p for the ES' curve are the same as
those for the ES curve.
Proposition 4. Siphoning shifts the ES curve toward real output.
Proof:
Because k is predetermined, its influence on equation A9 compared with
equation A5 is identical to that of capital accumulation or a technological
improvement, i.e. an increase in 1a k  . Therefore, the proof suggested for
proposition 3 is also applicable to this proposition, writing  
1
a k k

   for
1a k  in equation A7.
Repeated Siphoning
Proposition 5. Compared with the no-siphoning equilibrium, the continuous
siphoning equilibrium will shift in favour of higher concealed inflation when
the market demand curve is steeply sloping downward, and in favour of higher
output in the converse case.
Proof:
Let the firm siphon capital-augmenting resources k from the retail market so
its production function becomes:
(A10)  
1
q a k k e



     .
The ES curve with siphoning (the ES' curve) becomes:
(A11)  
1
1 1
1
1 p pq a k k
x p






 
            
  
.
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The firm’s hidden revenues in repeated siphoning are given as:
(A12) ˆ ˆ( ), 1 0, 0,b r q p p r q p p       
where
(A13) ˆ , , 0p z q z     .
Combine equations A11, A12, and A13:
(A14)  
1
11 1
1
1 p pq a k s r q z q p
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, 1
1
p pB
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
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, and
 
1C k s r q z q p        
 
.
Equation A14 suggests that hidden revenues increase real output; however,
real output is negatively associated with , the slope of the market demand
curve. When the market demand curve becomes steeper, real output decreases.
Given the same nominal output target, i.e. the PS curve is the same, concealed
inflation should therefore increase. The same logic applies when the market
demand curve becomes flatter: the result is higher real output but less
concealed inflation.
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Appendix 2. Demand Elasticities
Table A.1. The Firm’s Price Elasticity of Market Demand in Postwar Soviet
Industry by Branch
Price
elasticity
of firm’s
market
demand
Buyer can
find other
suppliers
within the
industry
Buyer can
find near
substitutes
within the
industry
Buyer can
find near
substitutes
outside the
industry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Machinery 0 0 0 0
Light industry 2 2 2 2
Chemicals 0 0 0 0
Wood, pulp, and paper 1 1 1 0
Construction materials 1 2 0 1
Food industry 2 2 1 2
Ferrous metals 0 0 0 1
Electric power 0 0 0 0
Fuels 1 0 1 1
Sources and Notes. 0 = “low” or “low probability,” 1 = “medium” or “medium
probability,” 2 = “high” or “high probability.” Column 1 is calculated as the
median of figures in the three columns to the right. These take into account the
structure of each industry (column 2), the scope for substitution among the
industry’s products (column 3), and the availability of alternative sources of
supply (column 4); for more discussion see the text. Figures are based on our
reading of a number of classic studies of the Soviet industrial and economic
structure including Berliner (1952, 1957), Granick (1954, 1964), and Nove
(1977), and of the Soviet “second economy” by Grossman (1977, 1979) and
Katsenelinboigen (1977), as well as more recent studies such as Davies
(1989), Davies (1994b), Harrison (1996), Davis (1999), and Kim (2002).
These studies support the rankings offered in the table rather than cardinal
measures. In column 2 we index the ability of buyers to find alternative
suppliers of a given product within the industry, setting it low in machinery,
chemicals, ferrous metals, electricity, and fuels, and high in light industry,
construction materials and the food industry, with other branches in between.
In column 3 we index the ability of buyers to switch from the product they
seek to another that is produced within the same industry, setting it low in
machinery, chemicals, and construction materials, and high in light industry,
with other branches in between. In column 4 we index the ability of buyers to
switch from the product they seek to another that is produced in another
industry or from another source such in-house sideline production or the
second economy, setting it low in machinery, chemicals, wood, pulp, and
paper, and electric power, and high in the light and food industries, with other
branches in between.
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